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The unravelling of the racial orders in the US and South Africa the in post-WW II era
should be understood in light of a central difference: whereas the South African state
played the leading role in elaborating and vigorously safeguarding the racial order, history
denied such a forthright role to the American state. Despite strong similarities between the
two racial orders, South Africa deservedly stands apart: few racial orders, after all, owe
their political development and rapid industrial modernization so directly to the high levels
of racial partisanship that marked the state in South Africa If South Africa is distinguished
by the explicitness of the state's commitment to racial supremacy well into the 20th
century, the defining characteristic of the US racial order in this century was its "Great
Dilemma", Gunnar Myrdals' famous description of the persistence of racial segregation
despite the nation's foundational commitment to egalitarianism.' Unable to commit itself
fully to either pole of this dilemma, racial partisanship in the US bore none of that mixture
of optimism, bravado and a certain sense of history that marked the state in South Africa
Although it flourished throughout all reaches of society, frequently with the active support
of the various levels of the state in the South as well as the North, racial domination relied
to a much greater degree on the racist permissiveness of civil society. In contrast to the
jungle of laws, regulations and administrative orders which governed South Africa's racial
order, racial domination in the US was frequently nurtured in shadowy and ambiguous
form, vulnerable to legal and political challenge: "custom", though highly effective, merely
posed as law; residential segregation seemingly arose through the dynamics of ethnic
succession—a theme generic to 20th century US history; bankers concocted illegal
strategies to withold housing loans; the administration of justice was rigged; and extra-
legal terror and intimidation achieved what law enforcement in South Africa openly
accomplished.
The result of this camouflaged and relatively less systemtic scale of intervention in the US
has rendered it easy for Americans to diminish and ultimately to forget about the country's
Gunnar Myrdal. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Demncracv (Harper iind Row.
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racial past. South Africans easily conceive of their racial order as a systemic structure of
racial domination in which the stale played a fundamental and vanguardist role. White
Americans—whenever a spectacular riot of court verdict prompts a high-pitched
consideration of the issue-are likley to portray the racial issue as a problem of "prejudice"
and "discrimination" lodged in civil society This basic contrast between the two racial
orders, this essay contends, sets the context for any understanding not only the demise of
formal segregation in the two countries, but also of the techniques for dealing with the
legacy of race
.•1 brief note: TH( \ and racial domination
Two qualifications should precede the analysis that follows. First, this essay compares the
TRC with a non-event-America's failure to generate anything that resembles a TRC-but
says nothing about a number of other countries such as Chile, Honduras, and El Salvador
where TRC-like bodies irwv established Moreover, as with the US. countries such as
Cambodia (where citizens want nothing to do with truth commissions), Japan and both
Germanies also made the transition from their compromised pasts without seeking to
"recommission the past" 2 Why, then, the comparison with the US? This essay is not
expressly concerned with issues of brutality and repression, which may be readily
discerned in all of the above countries Instead, it is concerned with racial domination and
racial memory, and especially with the virtual absence of collective racial memory in post-
60s America The bulk of the essay therefore explores why the US state has not even
considered a TRC despite centuries of racial domination—whereas, in contrast, it recently
agreed to pay $20, 000 to each of the Japanese families interned during WW II.'
Secondly, the essay remains agnostic about the likely success of reconciliation through
TRC-like bodies. Comparative evidence seems unclear on this point'1 and and the jury on
South Africa's own Commission is still out. The essay merely considers why the US did
not embark on a similar project of national reconciliation at any point in its history, but
especially in the 1960s, when conditions for it to do were most favourable.
Racial domination and the 'I'M'
Apartheid's tombstone sports an exact date of expiry. Precisely because race served as the
organising principle of state, market and society in South Africa, democracy required the
formal and comprehensive destruction of this principle This goal was achieved in 1994,
2
 Derek Smmiicrfield. "Soulh Africa: does a truth commission promote social reconciliation?", British
medical Journey. .115/712(1 (November 29. 1997).
' The issue of War-rclalcd reparations lo Japanese Americans is compared lo the "racial reparations"
movement in Oliver and Shapiro. IXX-190
' A spalc of essays on Ihis topic offers mixed reviews, most of which lend towards either agnostisin or
pessimism. For example, sec: Summcifield. "South Africa". Beth S. Lyon. "Between Nuremberg and
amnesia: the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa." Monthly Review. 49/4 (September
1997); Mike Kayc. "The role of truth commissions in the search for justice, reconciliation and
dcinocraliSoulli Africalion: Ihe Soulh Africalvadorcan and Honduran cases". Journal ofljitin American
Studies. 29/3 (October 1997);
marked by the democratic election of an ANC-led government and the installation of
Nelson Mandela as president. It is not possible to so precisely record the demise of
segregation j n the US. "The '60s" serves as the best dating method: by convention, the
decade marks the turning point in America's protracted encounter with race, the burial
place of the Great Dilemma. It was, in other words, a protracted death, one not too unlike
the lengthy demise of apartheid in South Africa. Prefigured by a notorious announcement
by Piet Koornhoff (the Minister of Black Administration and Development who declared
in 1979 that "Apartheid is Dead"), apartheid's last gasps scortched the nation for another
fifteen years before the electoral coup de grace of 1994 finally yielded the elusive corpse
The difference between the US and South Africa on this score is captured by the tly-by of
military jets which apartheid's military brass arranged at Mandela's presidential
inauguration. In America, ceremonial confirmation of segregation's demise registered at a
lower level, limited to President LB Johnson signing civil rights legislation flanked by the
most prominent leaders of the civil rights movement South Africans disagree about the
performance of their young democracy, but not about the demise of the racist regime
More than three decades after the civil rights agenda was formally chieved in the late
1960s, Americans continue to debate whether racial domination has been eliminated or
merely more effectively disguised
So stark and immense was racial domination in South Africa that solutions inevitably
focused on the thoroughgoing democratisation of the state By the 1980s, the
antiapartheid movement's implacable contentions that apartheid could not be "reformed"
and that nothing less than than a one-person one-vote solution would be acceptable,
remained firmly in place. These demands contained two important claims: about the
relationship of state and civil society and about the immorality of the NP regime
h'ir.stly, the ANC's strategy of refusing to accept nothing less than negotiate the definitive
end of racial domination assumed that the achievement of a black majority regime served
as a precondition for the transformation of civil society. Through the process of
transforming the racial order into a democratic state, new rules would emerge to decide
the scope and pace at which the myriad legacies and material limitations of apartheid
would be overcome and the daily life of the black majority improved The effect of this
expectation was to firmly focus attention on the radical transformation of the suite as the
means towards the democratisation of civil society.
Secondly, this perspective was governed by a clear understanding of the state's utter moral
bankruptcy. Throughout the negotiations process, the ANC refused to become complicit
in NP strategies that diluted but did not terminate racial domination. Its reasons for doing
so did not arise only from the strategic assessment that its popular support amongt the
majority of South Africans enabled it to adopt a hardline position in its negotiations with
the NP. Instead, its refusal to bear political responsibility for solutions that stopped short
of ending racial domination was also powerfully informed by a moral assessment of NP
rule as a form of calculated evil conducted through the secular means of the modern
rational state. The ANC's demand for the unambiguous cessation of NP rule therefore
rested on both political and moral grounds: the former buttressed its claim to legitimacy as
a political movement, the latter illuminated its status as a morally superior alternative to a
culture of institutionalised brutality, deviousness and deceit. Moreover, the ANC's
insistence that it would not seek vengeance for decades of NP mis-rule further burnished
its claim claims to moral superiority, a status which Nelson Mandela seemed to both
symbolise and exemplify in his conduct at home and abroad.
By itself, neither the ANC's popular political support nor its claims to moral superiority
would have emboldened it to apppoint the TRC. The two elements almost certainly
required each other. Without demonstrative evidence of the ANC's own moral integrity,
the appointment of a TRC would have been perceived as a duplicitous sham and an
opportunity to pillory officials of the old regime. Nevertheless, the decision to empower
the TRC to investigate allegations of ANC abuses in the exile years entailed a distinct
element of risk that threatened to perforate the movement's status as the injured party. It
is thus unlikely that the ANC would have proceeded with a TRC if it had not enjoyed the
majority support that it did, and it proceeded to do so for two reasons: not only would
revelations of its own sins of commission be almost certainly dwarfed by those of the
apartheid regime, but—committed as they were in the name of the black majority—these
transgressions would be pardoned by that same majority
Ultimately, the importance and authority of the TRC derived from its status as a creature
of the state Without the sanction and aura of the universal state, a "truth and
reconciliation" initiated by any private association in civil society would have been self-
defeating by fiat, unable to overcome the very fissions in society that required
"reconciliation" in the first place. Only the state, in its guise as the universal agent of
society, could muster both the resources and, more importantly, the requisite legitimacy to
interrogate the sordid past and legitimate the nettlesome business of establishing the
criteria by which some would be pardoned and others prosecuted By effectively placing
the state in the hands of the ANC, the electoral outcome of 1994 positioned the ANC to
deploy its claim to moral superiority and to plotter the state as the forum through which
the nation would be "healed". The ANC decision to submit its own practices before the
Commission did much to undermine claims that the Commission was a partisan body that
functioned according to a double standard
In one sense, the emergence of the state as a moral agent of reconciliation departed from
South Africa's historical record. Formerly overbearing and violently authoritarian, the
state after 1994 sought to integrate the business of administration with the conversion of
the state into a poignant site of interogation, moral reprimand, confession and conviction.
On this score, therefore, the work of the TRC represented an arresting volte face in South
Africa's pattern of state formation in the post WW II era. It graphically underscored not
only the political transformation of the state, epitimised in the elections of 1994, but,, also
the new state's support of governance conducted along reassuringly novel democratic
precepts such as openness, public accountability and compassion
In another sense, however, the work of the TRC also represents a continuity within South
African historiography-viz. the vanguard role which the state has played in the making of
the racial order. The sheer appointment of a TRC that targeted cadres of the ancien regime
flowed from this vanguard role. Much of the work of apartheid was conducted outside of
the law and out of sight. For the TRC, this meant that the sheer exposure of numberless
accounts of furtive misdeeds was a vital event in itself and a necessary precondition of the
commission's work of "reconciliation". At the same time, the plenitude of vicious police
state tactics merely reflected the brutality of the overall state. No feats of excavation were
required to reveal the racial partisanship and authoritarianism of the apartheid state The
signature of the apartheid state, indeed, was its public commitment to racial domination
This was not a racial state "by default", as may be said of the state in the US in the post-
WW II.5 The internal organisation of the South African state was structured along racial
lines, oppressive measures received parliamentary approval; and an inflated bureaucracy
was established to hammer "enforced ethnicity" into place, frequently at the point of the
bayonet. Not only did the internal organisational structure of the state reflect this mania
for systematic racialisation. Civil society was likewise hacked into racial and ethnic
encalves, and the full weight of the state was brought to bear on the need to police these
artificial divisions. Confronted with opposition at home and abroad, the NP state
unsuccessfully sought to preserve racial domination by judiciously diluting the vigor of its
grip over society. Under the intensifying glare of the world, it found itself hostage to
police state tactics invented from the early 60s onwards. Terror and violent repression
became its swansong. The result was the extraordinaraily public nature of the life and
death of Apartheid.
By harnessing the power of the state to expose the institutional and extra-legal atrocities
of apartheid, the TRC continued the South African tradition of "statism"--the ingrained
culture of state formation in South Africa This comment is not intended as a criticism: as
previously noted, the very legitimacy of any TRC depends on the aura of non-partisanship
that only a democratic state can bestow The pertinence of the observation arises from the
light it sheds on the contrast between "deracialisation" in South Africa and the US
Precisely why the democratic government installed in 1994 resolved to appoint a TRC is
not entirely clear because the appointment of a TRC was neither inevitable nor
indispensable for democracy.6 What is clear, however, is that the work of a TRC depends
on the ability to identify culprits; such a search only makes sense in contexts where the
state bears an undeniable responsibility for orchestrating a n oppressive onslaught on its
citizenry, or segments of the citizenry These two conditions—the availability of identifiable
perpetrators and the manifest guilt of the state—establish an important basis for contrasting
the demise of formal segregation in South Africa and the US. For whereas the apartheid
state and its footsoldiers were indubitably responsible for gross violations of human rights,
matters were understood to be considerably more ambiguous in the US in the 1960s, when
segregation was finally formally outlawed
Racial domination and "historicalguilt" in the IIS
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Myrdal's conclusion that US race relations constituted America's "Great Dilemma" was
more the work of scholarly analysis than an accurate reflection of the national conscience
on the matter. Myrdal published An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and
Modern Democracy in 1944, well after the violently racist vitriol of the Reconstruction
years had subsided into the system of segregation that would characterise the first half of
the 20th century, but also well before the political order was shaken and transformed by
the civil rights victories of the 1960s. Myrdal's work may have espoused the regret and
guilt that liberals felt in the middle of the 20th century, but it by no means served as an
aggregate summation of white opinion on the question of race. In the Northern states,
white liberalism was overshadowed by a combination of outright "prejudice", state-
supported segregationist measures and indifference to the racial question. The South,
although noticeably less violent and ideologically rigid than it was at the turn of the
century, remained a bastion of white supremacy. By the end of WW 11, racial terror no
longer played the public role that it had in earlier decades .' Instead, the Democratic Party
in the South welded racial domination to intangible but powerful claims about "custom"
and "the southern way of life", elevating these to centrestage to justify the racially
structured system of exploitation and segregation." The civil rights victories have been
described as "nothing less than a revolution in American life" precisely because differing
versions of the same national creed-white supremacy—were accepted with complacency
in the North and defended with passion in the south.
It is important to foreground the deracialisation movement of the 60s in the vitality of
racial domination throughout the US. For, as I argue below, the issue has a direct bearing
on both the denial which informs contemporary racial discourse and the mean-spirited
attack on institutions which most contemporatry white Americans view as
disporportionately advantaging African-Americans ' There is a slight irony in the
contrasting insurgent postures of the ANC and the civil rights movement. The ANC,
having presented itself as a political movement bent on state power, championed the moral
crusade of "reconciliation" conducted by the TRC. The civil rights movement, whose
pronounced moral discourse framed "reconciliation" as a vital pillar and goal of its
strategy, would ultimately fail to radically transform the racial character of state power in
the US As a number of writers have noted, it is little wonder that the contemporary
generation of African-American youth evince an increasingly jaded outlook on the civil
rights movement. For a generation exposed to the racial exclusiveness of the post-modern
economy and white refusals to concede the continuing scale and depth of racism in the
US, legacies of reconciliation and moral rectitude ring hollow. Marginalised in the post-
modern economy and increasingly disconnected from state power, cultural politics and
"the politics of identity"—punctuated by sporiadic popular outburts against the more
W F Bnmdagc. Lynching in the New South: (ieorgia ami lirginia. IHX0-I930. (University of Illinois
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blatant manifestations of institutionalised racism such as the LA riots of llJ94--are the
more resonant forums for this post-civil rights movement generation. The turn away from
institutional politics introduces a theme that is central to the rest of this essay, viz the
discursive centrality that "civil society" plays both in understandings of US racial history in
the post-WW II era.
The argument that follows rests on two inter-related claims Firstly, in seeking to broaden
democracy by restoring full citizenship rights to African-Americans, the civil rights
movement echoed the fallacy that the US was characterised by an essentially liberal
tradition that merely need to be perfected. In this fallacy, US political history is essentially
liberal and that racism is an unusually lengthy departure from this tradition In contrast, a
growing group of writers have recently argued that US history has sported not one but
many political traditions, all of which have been equally formative of the political culture
of the nation.1" Nevertheless, the civil rights movement fuelled one of the most potent
creeds of US political discourse: viz. that the coupling of individualism and democratic
opportunity account for the country's unique republican tradition of respect for the rights
of all Champions of this view certainly conceded that racism, ethnic prejudice and sexism
fill the American landscape, but general portray such illiberal tendencies as "expressions of
ignorance and prejudice, destined to marginality by their lack of critical defences" " This
recasting of US history was the animating logic of the assimilation theory, the dominant
model for understanding the race and ethnicity in 20th century America.1'
One of the lessons which assimilation theory explicitly upheld was the claim that race is
largely indistinguishable from ethnicity.13 In assimilation theory, racial domination is
portrayed—and "normalised"—as a particularly difficult case of ethnic exclusion, but one
that would eventually succumb to the overpowering historical process of assimilation into
"the American mainstream": there is more than a suggestion that racial domination is little
more than an American rite of passage, the price which ethnics pay for admission into
American citizenship. By establishing a false symmetry between the African American
experience and the "prejudice" that white ethnics encountered, assimilation theory robs
"race" of its claims to historical uniqueness, detaching it from roots that have been
singularly violent and selective. Depending on the historical sensibilities of different
champions of the approach, the approach mutes or denies the formative impress of chattel
slavery; the modernisation of slavery into a system that coupled sharecropping to a
pervasive culture of racial violence which included the terrorisation and lynching of
thousands of African Americans in the South; the persistent ghettoisation and labour
market marginalisation of African Americans migrants to the North and their reception
there by white riots that left dozens dead in the first half of this century; and the continuing
cultural demonisation of African Americans as a racial Other in the otherwise virtuous
circle of American society Only by either ignoring these systemic historical continuities or
"' Suxlon; Allen: Lowe; Lipsilz.
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consigning most of them to the unexplored box of "the past" is assimilation theory able to
posit African Americans as sni generis citizens Civil rights victories, the approach
concludes, finally expunged the defect of racism from the liberal tradition. Having gained
full civil and political rights, African Americans lost their special moral claims on the
state.14
Notwithstanding its steady erosion in academia. assimilation discourse continues to exert a
powerful effect on contemporary political and cultural discourse. The assertion that the
civil rights movement has lanced the racial carbuncle, if not actually removed the detritus
of the malaise, discourages contemporary Americans from grasping the full dimensions of
whiteness and its attendant priviliges by engaging the past. In the popular mind,
contemporary social problems bear only the remotest possible connection to the
oppressive past History, a perspective with a decreasing purchase on American politics
and contemporary identities, is grasped as a sort of a corrupting trough from which all
manner of "special interest groups" expediently turn to fuel their pet peeves. Attempts to
reclaim the past, whether in the form of scholarly exposes about the multiple traditions of
America's political and cultural history or by activists who assert the right of women and
other minorities, are damned as divisive evidence of a "culture of complaint" spawned by
the civil rights victories of the 1960s " American popular culture acknowledges (even as it
distorts by romanticising) the role of white ethnicity in the 20th century, locating its
origins in the immigration waves of the last quarter of the 19th cenury. In contrast, racial
history in the popular mind begins firmly in the 1960s, the decade of "equalisation"." The
paucity of racial remembrance all but closes off a full appreciation of the systemic
transmission and historical mutability of racial domination
White disinclinations to concede the historical claims of African Americans were not
fuelled only by the canonical notions about "assimmilation" The second claim advanced
below centres around the role of state intervention in this process—specifically, on a
growing white resentment against the democratisation of the state's role in regulating the
social sphere The "politics of resentment" that emerged in the post-60s era and congealed
in the Reagan era are closely linked to the interventionist programs initiated by President
FD Roosevelt. Numerous observers have pointed out that the US developed a system of
social welfare late in its history relative to other advanced industrial states and that New
Deal policies were not as comprehensive as those in other advanced capitalist
democracies '7 Nevertehless, FDR's legislative program of the 1930s faced rising
opposition, barely surviving legal challenges and opposition from fellow Democrats and
oppositional Republicans alike. It is instructive to contrast these early challenges to the
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vitriolic attacks on "big governmment" and "social spending" launched in the Reagan
years and sustained thereafter by a Republican-controlled Congress with the support of
President Clinton. In The Colon)/ Welfare, for example, Jill Quadagno notes that the
Social Security Act of 1934 was not only popular with Congress in the 1930s but also
enjoyed strong popular support for three decades thereafter, buoyed by the unprecedented
growth of the mass production/mass consumption Fordist economy in the post-WW II
era. She also notes that evidence of the effectiveness of "big government" is extensive for
this period: for example, poverty amongst those 60 years and older dropped steeply
amongst those 60 years and older fiom §940 to I960.'8 Most liberal democracies shared in
this post-War boom, which had much to do with the state's expanding social profile until
at least the mid-1960s.
David Harvey and others have demonstrated that the anti-statist discourse which became
hegemonic in western capitalist democracies was a response to the structural exhaustion
of the Fordist mass production/consumption model.'9 In the US, however, the
politicisation of the state's presence in society was exacerbated by the unfortunate
coincidence of two historic developments in the 1960s: the passage of the civil rights
legislation just as the Fordist economy began to slow down. This, while anti-statist attacks
on the "security state" also emerged in other advanced democracies in this period, the
intense racialisation of the debate coloured this development in the US. The inescapable
conclusion that Jill Quadagno makes is that white voters in the US supported, and were
prepared to pay for "big government" programs as longs as the benefits returned to them
and began to withdraw their support once civil rights legislation extended these to non-
whites. In doing so, whites correctly interpreted America's brief history of social
welfarism: social welfare programs were indeed established primarily for whites The New
Deal was portrayed in the 1930s and 40s as a race-neutral program of government
intervention. However, numerous writers, most recently the cultural historian George
Lipsitz, have demonstrated that the New Deal was a deal primarily for whites, particularly
for white economic elites. This was no less true in the North than in the South, where
FDR permitted pro-segregationists in his party to use their dominance over virtually all
key federal committees to deflect New Deal dollars away from the most destitute and
vulnerable groups to industrialists, big farmers and racist state programs in the South 2"
Although this also meant that the benefits of the New Deal were withheld from the
poorest whites in the South, those who suffered most were impoverished sharecroppers,
the vast majority of whom were black. Indeed, two pivotal pieces of legislation, the
Wagner Act and the Social Security Act, were framed to expressly exclude farm and
domestic workers from coverage.21 This meant that protections and benefits that even the
poorest white workers could routinely use to buttress or improve their social position
were denied to the majority of black workers and their families.
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The racialisation of social benefits was a pervasive feature of New Deal programs. For
example, racist "criteria" on the applications forms of the Federal Housing Agency
enabled state bureaucrats and private bankers to deny virtually all loan applications from
minority communities, thereby making federal resources available to even less qualified
white applicants. A vitally important study by Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro (1997)
has recently dissected the racial consequences of real estate politics. Deflecting the
overwheliming attention that social scientists pay to sheer income as a primary
determinant of class position, Oliver and Shapiro ground class formation in the post-WW
II era in "asset accumulation" and the multiplier effects that home ownership in particular
has on class mobility. Their study demonstrates that the racialised home ownership
patterns fuelled by Federal Housing Agency (FHA) programs continue to play a central
role in promoting white middle class mobility while severely hindering asset accumulation
and, relatedly, educational and income mobility mungst blacks. By the time civil rights
legislation was signed, huge and, to date, intractable racial differentials were set in place . "2
These outcomes cannot be abstracted from the housing and urban renewal programs
which municipal and federal governments established from the 1950s onwards under the
aegis of race-neutral urban programs These may be grouped under two broad headings.23
Firstly, a combination of tax deductions, federal mortgage guarantees and highway
constructions designs converged with racist local real estate strategies to channel white
homebuyers out of the inner city areas towards the affluent suburbs of what soon be called
post-industrial cities. At the same time, the suburbanisation of white homeowners matched
the suburbanisation of industry and the Supported by the Federal Housing Agency, 10
million middle- and upper-income private houses mushroomed in the suburbs be tween
1937 and 1968 Secondly, the state simultaneously financed the construction of a paltry
800.000 low income public housing, empowering municipalities to decide whether and
where to locate public housing The results were predictable then; today they are
everywhere conspicuous: by the 1960s, low income public housing was sited in ways that
entrenched traditional patterns of residential segregation, trapping African American
communities in deteriorating inner city areas, where deindustrialisation and the emergence
of the information economy had already begun to whittle away at employment
opportunities for blue collar communities.24
I raile unions were important players in this racialised racial feeding frenzy which was
conducted silently in accordance with ostensibly race-neutral New Deal programs
Moreover, social benefits did not only fall to whites by the default of racialised state
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programs. For example, numerous unions, George Lipsitz writes, "negotiated contract
provisions giving private medical insurance, pensions, and job security largely to the white
workers who formed the overwhelming majority of the unionised labor force in mass
production industries, rather than fighting for full employment, medical care, and old age
pensions for all, or even for an end to discriminatory hiring and promotion practices by
employers and institutions"2S~a catalogue that does not include "obvious" customs such
as the racial covenants used to exclude blacks from white residential areas Collectively,
these racialised advantages implanted a gulf between the material fortunes of white and
black Americans. Lipsitz refers to the net effect of racialised social programs and the racist
ploys they stoked in civil society as "the possessive investment in whiteness"—that is. the
conversion of whiteness into an effective income-generating asset in an ostensibly race-
A central feature of the possessive investment in whiteness, therefore, was the extensive
complicity of the state in restructuring the racial order. The majority of white Americans,
however, fail to acknowledge the scale of the state's involvement in engineering racial
domination and the massive legacies this has entailed. Already true in the 1960s, the
highpoint of racial contrition, this failure would congeal into a widespread denial of the
state's extensive culpability in American's recent racial past
A potent brew of extraordinary and well-known events—the civil rights movement; its
articulation with student protests against American involvement in the Vietnam conflict:
the conflict between the federal government and segregationist southern states; the
assassination of JF Kennedy and then of Martin Luther King—were required to bring most
Americans to the brink of acknowledging the scale of its racial past. But not even waves
of sporadic rioting in a number of cities between 1966 and 1968 succeeded in wresting
from Congress a determined legislative attack on "racial discrimination", let alone the
resources to redress centuries of racial domination At the same time, the years of
insurgent mass movements clearly altered the priorities of the state, with race and poverty
emerging as central themes in national politics. Amidst mounting social chaos. President
LB Johnson declared an "war on poverty" in 1964 and followed up in 1968 with an
equally ambitious vision of the "Great Society" free of material want and racial
discrimination. These were the highwater years of racial reform in the US. illuminating
both the extent and the limits of white's preparedness to aggressively reverse the legacy of
race. Although race was frequently ensconced within a broader vision of national and
international reform (by way of the international fight against Communism), the issue also
enjoyed independent consideration.
By 1968, segregation was in firm retreat, beaten back by a combination of the structural
modernisation of the southern economy, the two major development these changes
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encouraged—massive grassroots resistance and the capitulation of economic elites in the
South-and desegregations! legislation spearheaded by the two Johnson administrations.
A host of social measures and programs were set in place to improve the immediate living
conditions of the poor: the desegregation of schools was begun; the Civil Rights Act of
1964 outlawed discrimination in voting , all public accommodations, schools, employment,
and public facilities, while the Voting Rights Act a year later abolished rigged devices such
as literacy tests which white Southernes had been used to disenfrachise blacks; the
Economic Opportunity Act sought to widen employment opportunities in "underpriviliged
areas" and created an Office of Economic Opportunity to coordinate the "war on
poverty"; the Civil rights Act of l%8 opened 80% of the nation's housing units, including
privately owned homes, to buyers or renters without discrimination; a Food Stamp Act
placed the distribution of food on a permanent basis; an Urban Mass Transportation Act
authorised federal loans to states to develop urban transportation systems; and the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act provided funds to aid primary and secondary
schools in areas where at least 3% Of the children were classified as "needy" "7
If the US state had not actually appointed a TRC to explore the past as a means towards
reconciliation over the issue of race, these sorts of measures indicate that there were
grounds for optimism that the process was proceeding nonetheless Further evidence may
be taken from the report of the 1969 National Advisory [Kerner] Commission on Civil
Disorders, appointed by Johnson in part to investigate the grievances underlying the urban
riots of the late 1960s Although it produced a laundry list of "grievances", the basic
finding of the Kerner Commission was that white racism and overt hostility towards blacks
were the principal reason behind the "civil disorders".2*
But was the dominant population actually contrite? The success of Johnson's legislative
proposals with regard to racial no doubt reflected the distaste which a growing number of
whites viewed racism and racial segregation; similarly, the passage of the social welfare
measures of the sort indicated above suggests that whites conceded the need for the state
to take the lead in redressing the legacies of race. The assassination of ML King in April
1968, and the extraordinary rioting that immediately ensued in 168 cities across the
country, redoubled this sense of guilt and apology amongst whites. At the same time, there
were ominous signs that this racial contrition was highly contingent and insufficiently
thorough to resist the gravitational attraction which "race" exerted on American politics.
Even as they emerged, Johnson's ambitious attempts to prod the nation into far-reaching
racial reform encountered three major obstacles. Firstly, an unprecedented coordination
across the state's "counter-intelligence" security apparatuses secured the destruction of
radical black orgnizations and the liquidation of the most prominent radical young leaders
in the Black Power movement. A crisis of legitimacy arose between African American
youth and the state as law enforcement authorities succeeded in confining radical black
:7
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politics to the ghetto areas where radical politics were transformed into a gang culture.2''
The two other obstacles that Johnson's reforms had to contend with were a widening
while hostility to the radicalisation of the civil rights movement and the massive fiscal
burdens which Johnson's decision to escalate the war in Vietnam imposed on the state By
1967, the US was spending the then staggering amount of $30 billion on a conflict
seemingly without end. Johnson's escalation of the war not only effectively doomed his
social programs. It also emboldened a Democrat-controlled Congress in 1968 to refuse a
number of items dealing with poverty and open housing on the grounds that such expenses
would fuel "deficit spending" and lead to higher taxes—introducing a theme that would
escalate to the forefront of the national agenda once the Republicans gained the presidency
with the election of Richard Nixon and later, Ronald Reagan. Nurtured between these
two pincers in the turbulent days on the mid- and late-60s. white contrition wilted and
dissipated before re-emerging, radically transformed, on the political and economic
landscape of a post-industrial America. From the 1970s onwards, "race" steadily lost the
public and explicit political role it had played in American politics, losing its mobilising
capacity in the process. As the heady days of "the 60s" receded into the past, a new
political era marked from below by an emphasis on cultural differentiation and identity
politics and, from above, an escalating onslaught on the state's presence in civil society,
white Americans in the 1980s embarked on what sometimes seems like a national amnesia
about "race". By the 1990s, this denial of "race" was accompanied by a more sinister
development. As Henry Giroux notes about this decade, "racism is respectable again".""
Begun with "non-violence" in the South in the 1950s, the civil rights movement fuelled an
increasingly aggressive and militant politics in the North in the 1960s Young leaders
centred in the SNCC distanced themselves from the non-violence of ML King other civil
rightsleaders and the NAACP, and demanded the construction of militant black nationalist
movement that should not shirk from violence as a matter of principal. Simultaneously,
black students demanded the establishment of "black studies" as a legitimate and normal
component of university courses programs both to recover an ignored history and to re-
frame future discourse about race Such demands tested the limits of white tolerance and
incensed overwrought college administrators, business leaders, law enforcement officers,
politicians and ordinary Americans alike. The "Black Power" movement's flirtation with a
highly telegenic militarist demeanor became a scapegoat for the "law and order"
movement that emerged from the 1965 in response to three themes: evidence of growing
racial conflict marked, in particular, by urban riots in the North; the widening of student
revolt against the war against the war in Vietnam; and the upsurge in the national crime
rate. Conservatives capitalised on this gordian knot of inflammatory issues and, by electing
Nixon president, rode the backlash against the "permissive 60s" into power.
"'" Former Plack Panther members argue Hint I he elimination of militant leaders led to the dcligilimalion
of law enforcement authorities in the ghetto areas. Young blacks accordingly sought to protect themselves
and organised clhcmselvcs into neighbourhood associations which evolved into competing gangs "The
Fire Next Time" (Blacktop Movies. 1992).
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There uas to he no "reconciliation" Instead, the path to national amnesia began with the
Nixon years as whiles sought to undo or evade the constraints which civil rights
regulations imposed on them The attempt to expose state complicity in systematic racial
domination, and to involve it in a systematic reversal of the legacies of race, had endured
for a few brief and frenzied years in the mid- to late 60s; moreover, the state's security
apparatuses had sabotaged Johnson's reform program in this same period. But it was not
only slate apparatuses which had sought to out-maneuver the reform initiative. Ordinary
whiles had also sought to circumvent both the spirit and the letter of the civil rights era
during the '60s Violent white resistance to residential segregation emerged in many
Northern cities One example dealing with the 1968 Fair Housing Act will suffice to
impart the implacable refusal of whites to submit to residential integration with the active
encouragement of the local political machinery." In the 1960s, plaintiffs took recourse to
the federal court and charged Chicago's public housing authority with racial
discrimination A federal judge agreed and found the city guilty, issuing an order for the
city to construct 700 new units of public housing in white neighbourhoods and to locate
75% of new public housing outside the inner-city ghetto Rather than comply with the
order, the Chicago Housing Authority responded "by ceasing construction on all new
public housing as a means of evading integration".'2
Nixon's presidency latched onto this emerging backlash. Under Nixon, desegregation was
upheld by the Supreme Court and eroded by the Nixon administration Nixon's first
administration sought to reverse the desegregation of schools (even after the Supreme
Court ruled in 1969 that the process should be accomplished "at once" and not merely, as
formerly, "with all convenient speed"). While affirming the importance of integration,
Nixon also sought to outlaw the bussing of schoolchildren across racially drawn
residential boundaries and lent support to white communities in the North to resist the
integration of schools and residential areas This strategy of simultaneously reaffirming
integrationist rhetoric while undercutting it in practice was rapidly pursued in all aspects of
the state's racial policies Anti-discrimination provisisons had been tepidly enforced in the
Johnson years, under Nixon, they were largely abandoned Whites, in short, experimented
briefly with "reconciliation" through social programs and then rapidly dropped the
excercise even before results could be ascertained.
The racial motivations behind these counter-attacks are as clear now as they were then. In
what sense, therefore, did they facilitate an "amnesia" about race"? The answer lies in the
transformation of racial discourse in the wake of the civil rights victories of the 1960s, a
watermark epoch in the transformation of white identities Because white discourse about
race could no longer appeal directly to racial sentiments, the defence of racial privilege
was shifted to an alternative terrain marked by a palpable uncertainty and defensiveness un
white racial discourse This process, Winant argues in Du Boisian fashion, is a species of
Sec Gregory Squires, ('hicafin : Race. ('lass, and the Response to Urban Decline. (Temple University
Press. 1987) and Capital and I'ommunily in Mack and While. (University of NY Press. I'J!)4); Douglas
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the "racial dualism" which Du Bois recognised to be hallmark of racialised self identities:
viz. the almost schizophrenic tendency, or compulsion, for racialised subjects to view
themselves simultaneously from within and from without. Whiteness had been an
unreflecting and largely "monolithic" asset prior to the civil rights movement. The
insurgent challenges of the 60s splintered this racialised identity, compelling whites to self-
consciously navigate between the straits of their racial past and their contemporary
embattled position: "On the one hand, whites inherit the legacy of white supremacy, from
which they continue to benefit. But on the other hand, they are subject to the moral and
political challenges posed to that inheritance by the partial but real successes of the black
movement (and affiliated movements)" Thrust onto unfamiliar ground, white identity
formation entered into a period of ferment and uncertainty without parallel in US history
In the contemporary period, whiteness continues to be a highly profitable asset: at the
same time, white identities are "confused and anxiety-ridden" "
Far from embarking on a thorough-going and painful journey of historical interrogation,
post-60s white racial politics have dwelled on the implications of what it means to be
white'4 and how the "wages of whiteness" may be earned with the least moral qualm The
resultant diversity of racial disccourses has served to obscure the historical anchors of
whiteness and diminishes a full appreciation of the state's culpability in racialising
contemporary inequities Forearmed with only a faulty appreciation of the historical
rootedness of these inequities, white racial politics in the post-'60s have been stoked by
"the politics of resentment"." In courses dealing with race and ethnicity in the US, maiiy
young white college students strongly suspect that these inequities are deeply rooted in
"the legacy of slavery", and some are indeed able to almost intuitively plot the lineage
from slavery and its explosive denouement, the Civil War, through "segregation in the
South" and the denoument of this latter system of "race relations" in "the 60s" But this
historical perspective is by no means either comprehensive or representative Even
amongst college students, few grasp the immensity of the state's role in the staggering
record of lynchings and other forms of physical mutilation in the South Virtually all
students are astonished by the spate of recent historical studies which locate the origins of
whiteness in the transition from a vicious system of white indentured labour to racial
slavery in the 17th century."1 Few grasp the formiddable violence that was built into the
system of sharecropping. Even fewer appreciate how deeply implicated race was in
national presidential politics as late as the 1950s when, for example. Democratic Party
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leaders (including JF Kennedy) refused to support federal anti-lynching legislation because
they feared the loss of Southern votes, or that the provisions of the vaunted New Deal
(such the Gl Bill or the FHA) racialised benefits that would play pivotal roles in vaulting
white ethnics into "mainstrean, middle-class America" at the express expense of African
Americans Most students are also unaware that segregation was not only the product of
"prejudice" amongst racist whites, but was also vigorously enforced through municipal
and slate legislation. A number of students in a class I taught in 19% vigorously denied
thai federal law enforcement authorities and the LAPD would ever have connived in the
early 1970s in what basically were quasi-legal death squads to assassinate militant Black
panther leaders in Los Angeles They were outraged at the analogies I drew between
security operations in apartheid South Africa and the US
At the same time, it should be noted that the majority of these students are receptive to
such historical revelations The disbelieving students referred to above, for example were
astonished when I presented them with a newspaper cutting from the IMS Angeles Times
in which the city's Police Department admitted to and publically apologised its attacks on
peaceful and unarmed Black Panthers. This is important evidence, perhaps, of the
enlightening role which copious exposes of the son documented by the TRC may
potentially play Still, two caveats are in order Firstly, enlightened college students are by
no means representative of white America-a population whose shaky grasp of historical
continuity dismayed Alexis de Tocqueville as far back as the 1850s.'7 By all accounts, this
historical sense has taken a decided turn for the worse in the late 20th century <8 Secondly,
like other while Americans, white students necessarily grasp "race" in the context of the
vexed and camouflaging racial discourse of today. Little wonder, therefore, that even
enlightened college-goers contemplate challenges to the benefits of whiteness with that
mixture of perturbation, guilt and resentment which has characterised white identity
politics in the post-'60s Class discussions with students elicit an almost palpable
resentment that sometimes bursts put into heated denials: "Why should I be blamed for
slavery?" "Why should I feel guilty about being white?" These students are already
anxious about securing one of the1 vanishing long-term "career" positions in the post-
industrial economy, they are also bombarded (by professors and the media alike) with
warnings about the need to calibrate such expectations with the rapidly changing skill
requirements of an economy in which "serial employment"'" is but another name for the
routinization of intermittent unemployment. With much on its plate, this generational
cohort is sorely tempted to view historical dredgings of the racial past either as irrelevant
or potentially harmful to their own individual fonunes-despite abundant evidence that
whiteness continues to be highly profitable in the post-industrial economy.'"'
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The lineage of such resentment begins with the conservative backlash against the "racial
dualism" which the civil rights movement foisted onto whites. Indeed, a primary
orientation of the conservative backlash has been to wipe away the historical perspective
that the civil rights movement dragged onto the centre state of American politics
Obstructed by a new legal and moral culture from returning to past practices, whites'
racial dualism has been rendered through a number of discourses whose common coin.
Howard Winant writes, is the 'Vvarticulation, representation, [and] /•(.'interpretation of the
meaning of race". These discourses latched onto the colour-blind rhetoric of the civil
rights movement, contorting unimpeachable creeds such as the commitment to "freedom",
"equality" and a "colour-blind society" into weapons for shoring up the threatened
privileges of whiteness. Winant usefully catalogs the proliferation of these "race neutral"
discourses into four "racial projects", distinguished from one another only by the
"explicit, meaning each project attaches to 'whiteness'" 4I Noting that they should be
treated as malleable ideal types which share overlapping themes in practice. Winant posits
these projects as the discursive vehicles which have simultaneously normalised and
mobilised the politics of resentment, belittling (and even banishing) the moral reprimands
of the civil rights movement in the process.
The Far Righl racial project ably captures the extent to which civil rights movement
discourse has been conscripted to the crusade to preserve whiteness. Formerly
championed by adherents as extreme as the Ku Klux Klan and America's Nazi mob. this
project is today spearheaded by respectable, media-friendly neo-fascists such as David
Duke, an unrepentant KKK member who was almost elected to the US Senate in 1992
and today is a familiar presence on national TV shows. In place of biologically-grounded
claims about racial superiority, however, the Far Right has been rejuvenated by its
portrayal of whites as the justifiably aggrieved victims of "assimilationists" and
"multiculturalists". The latter are said to now control the US state and use devices such as
affirmative action to destabilize hard-working and law-abiding whites. A white racial
movement is therefore required to counter the racial hijacking of the state and to ensure
that all "racial groups" have "equal rights"
The New Right is distinguished from the Far Right chiefly by its more sophisticated use of
"code words" to inflame and harness the resentment of whites. Whereas the Far Right
rejects "colour-blindness" in principle, the New Right accepts this principle but rejects the
use of the state resources or state policy as the means to achieve it. Perfectly aware that
the absence of state intervention and the diminution of legal restraints on white racism will
effectively preserve the racial status quo. New Rightists fasten onto the racial fears and
material insecurities of whites—a strategy with potent appeal at a time when many white
Americans were reeling from the combined effects of deindustrialisation and economic
recession. This thrust accounted for the solid support which New Rightists gave to the the
"Reagan revolution", delighted at the Republican Party's attack on such hot-button issues
as affirmative action and state intervention in the economy.
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Collectively, although for somewhat different motivations, these three racial projects
escalated the desire of most white Americans to gloss over and ultimately ignore the racial
issue The fourth tendency, viz. Neo-liberal racial project departs somewhat from these
approaches in precisely this regard but, at the same time, also not completely The
approach explicitly acknowledges America's racial past and the stale's historic complicity
in the construction of the racial order; moreover, it warns that America will remain an
"unfinished democracy" unless its stark racial differentials are eliminated. Ultimately,
however, it also rejects race-based solutions, not for principled and ideological reasons as
the other approaches do, but for strategic ones. For example, William Julius Wilson, the
most prominent advocate of this approach, rests his class-based and "social democratic"
solution to contemporary racial domination on the following assessment Wilson argues
that most racial differentials today are accounted for by the dynamics of objective class
polarisation: the post-industrial economy disproportionately advantages highly educated
labour and renders blue-collar workers redundant Whites qua individuals therefore do not
hold responsibility for the resultant racial differentials and such should not be readily
accused of "racism". Accordingly, instead of further antagonising whites (a demographic
majority with a proven capacity to strike back at the polls) by sticking to faulty affirmative
action policies, a progressive social policy should rather enlist white support by
incorporating whites as beneficiaries in any social dispensation. For Neo-conservatives
therefore, the racial solution lies in a "color-blind, gender neutral regime of individual
rights ... combined with government activism promoting a high degree of substantive
social economic equality".43
These four discourses span a wide political spectrum and suggest the enormity of the
discursive etiology of today's racial amnesia and the intimidating scale of the effort
required to continually jolt, let alone reverse it. Despite sometimes significant differences
amongst the discursive trends above, their combined effect has been to greatly suppress
the overt exploration of race and the singular role this construct continues to play in the
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culture, politics and economy of the US The material gains and political strategies
associated with the civil rights movement are the sounding board against which the
dominant trends within America's recent political discourse about race has been
formulated. Precisely because racial differentials widened steadily from the 1970s until the
boom economy of the mid-'90s44 and also because African Americans have been more
demonised now than at any point in recent memory, this silence has been both
exasperating and intimidating. It has been an exasperating epoch for a multitude of
reasons, all of which may be traced by a desire amongst most whites to either wilfully
forget that African Americans were formally unshackled from racial restraints a mere 30
years ago and that many of the gains they made were all but obliterated by "race neutral"
anti-state policies in the 1970s and "80s
When white Americans "remember" race, it has often been to demonise African Americans
The demonization of African Americans as work-shy and "welfare queens" in the Reagan
years and thereafter, for example, simply flies in the face of abundant empirical research
Research has repeatedly confirmed that there are no significant differences between black
and white work ethics; that the notion of "welfare queens" living off the state is a tragic
myth; that disappearing blue collar jobs of a depleted industrial sector, not the sudden
collapse of "family values" and "individual responsibility", has transformed once-vibrant, if
poor, African American communities into devastated ghettoes; that African American
youth are repeatedly passed over in the job market in favour of white applicants; that the
relocation to the suburban fringe of industry and better-paying jobs in the hi-tech economy
places African American workseekers at a decided geographical disdvantage both because
travel costs become onerous and because because African Americans are frequently
harrassed simply for moving out of "their" inner-city areas Equally abundant research,
including statistics produced by pro-Reaganite authors, also demonstrate that if the state
has all but forgotten about the racial poor, it most certainly did not forget about the white
elite or that this stratum would benefit handsomely from concerted state support: it is a
consensus by now that the decimation of the welfare state over the past fifteen years or so
was matched by the greatest bout of corporate welfare in history and by generous
concessions to the property-owning middle class However, empirical evidence about the
fuel and the benefits' of such racialised state intervention has not seriously disrupted white
antipathy towards African Americans as a group or the tendency to denounce social
welfare as a "racial handout".
As economic policy recast the most hapless victims of the industrial era—blue collar
workers—into racialised villains, the cultural apparatuses lent powerful support to the
process. From "Nigger"-quoting movies such as I'ulp l-'iciion to terrifying and breathless
accounts of "gangbanging" homicides on the five o'clock news, Americans were fed an
unending barrage of mrages and representations of African Americans as steeped in drugs.
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mayhem and virtually unrestrained "wilding" 4S The "war on drugs" provided endless and
telegenic fodder for white murage, not withstanding such widely available information Ihat
most LiiiiMiinci.s of drugs are white or thai mandatory federal sentencing guidelines
compel judges to imprison crack offenders (most of whom are not white) to sentences
three times longer than for the possession of equivalent amounts of cocaine (most of
whose users arc white) Resarch also confirms that the high incarcaration rate for African
Americans does not stem from the commission of more crimes by blacks, but from the
arrest policies of law enforcement agencies. In the Regan era, these policies were driven
by the "war on drugs". As Michael Tonry and others have shown, there was nothing
inevitable about the way the "war on drugs" was formulated. Policy makers had a variety
of strategies to choose from, including targeting the largely (white) consumers of drugs
and improving rehabilitation programs. At the decision was taken to focus the "war" on
small-time distributors, law enforcement authorities warned Regan's personnel that this
strategy would have overt racial consequences because most street-corner hustlers were
non-white By 1990. 80% of African American prisoners were in prison for drug-related
offences and one out of every four black males between the ages of 18-35 years was in
some form of penal supervision: graphic evidence ihat the "war" on poverty has been
superceeded by the (far more costly) "war on drugs"/"' Some researchers have concluded
that drug-related arrests were so high in the late 80s and early 90s that the official
unemployment figures were artificially boosted in this period.41
The "moral panic" which rap music stirred up within "mainstream America" provided yet
another front for the cultural demonization of African American youth, particularly young
black males Dumbfounded by the iconography, vernacular and masculinist street
posturing of a genre that struck "middle Americans" as incomprehensible, cultural
commentators used the media to demonise rap as "the black monster's music",
stigmatising and virtually criminalising an entire generation of black males who merely
sported trendy "gangsta" attire.48 Buttressing the racial coding in the popular media was
the appearance of a spate of fashionable "academic" texts such as The Hell ('urve which
re-popularised Darwinist notions about the genetic basis of black inferiority by suggesting
that social welfare policies were a misiguided waste of public resources because, the
authors' data persuaded them, African Americans were likely to have lower IQs than
whites ' As an indication of racism's new-found confidence in contemporary America,
Dinesli D'Souza argued in 1995 that rather than harp on "the legacies of slavery", African
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Americans should instead be grateful to whites for releasing them from bondage in the
first place !su
The most striking aspect of all this is the extent to which ordinary Americans have become
blase about the grim outlook of contemporary African Americans Data about racial
differentials are either recieved as further evidence of the inability of African Americans to
"improve themselves" or, when they are accepted, are viewed as intermittent reports from
a far-off battle zone. There is little popular appreciation of the historical continuities that
manifest themsleves in contemporary "race relations" just as there is a refusal to
acknowledge that the material largesse and cultural affirmations of whiteness were built
into racialised state programs in the recent past amount to a form of affirmative action for
whites—or that this form of affirmative action dwarfs the affirmative action benefits that
blacks and other minorities have received since the late- 1960s Only spectacular jolts, it
seems, are capable of snapping the resultant amnesia about race, and then only briefly
President Clinton's televised "townhall meetings" to discuss racial issues, like the
prestigious panel he assembled to keep the discussion going, have disappeared without
trace whatsoever from the headlines. The Clintons' sojourn through Africa in 1997
included an apology from Clinton for America's role in the slave trade That, too. was an
inconsequential, and belated, formality More resilient and consequential are "the politics
of resentment" which sometimes pop up unexpectedly When a TV reporter asked for his
opinion about the riots that erupted after the white police were found not guilty for the
brutal beating they administered to Rodney King unaware that the onslaught was being
recorded, an apopleptic young white man responded: "They riot-we vote! We'll get them
at the polls!"51
The correct refusal of whites to accept individual blame for the racial past contrasts starkly
with the zeal which many many do not hesitate to attach group responsibility for acts
committed by African American individuals. The racism lies at the core of this hypocrisy is
sustained not so much by the absence of an historical perspective about race but by a
refusal to concede that whiteness and the cross-generational transfer of its manifest
advantages are directly implicated in the continuing subordination of African Americans.
To treat the racial past seriously would compel whites to acknowledge the scale of their
collective debt to the racial state. The prospects of this occuring remain slight for the
forseeable future. Instead, whites remain wedded to notions that "prejudice" and
"discriminatory attitudes" are the personal defects of individuals in civil society.
Analagously, whites view their own progress as the reward of individual merit As with
other disquieting issues such as pornography and rampant gun-ownership, racist
individuals in civil society are viewed as the unfortunate price Americans pay for their
vibrant democracy. Perspective on race within the dominant population echo de
Tocqueville's anxieties about the "tyranny of public opinion" in egalitarian America "
"'D'Souza, Dinesh. The End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial Society. (Free Press. 1995). 113.
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For African Americans, this means thai the struggle lo improve materially is. as it always
has been, also a struggle against their cultural demonization. All immigrant ethnic groups
have had to contend with the perils of scapegoating and the indignities of marginalisation.
At the same time, for the vast majority of its citizens America's 20th century history
appears to confirm many stereotypes of the "assimilationism" model, chief of which is
that hard individual effort will be rewarded by full inclusion into the nation. It is clear by
now that Americans will not willingly abandon the assimilationist model to accomodate
the realities of the African American experience For as long that unwillingness remains
dominant, history will remain distorted and the truth obscured Racial reconciliation did
not accompany the formal deracialisation of America because racial inequities were too
structurally embedded in whiteness, planted there in part by the racial state itself. Racial
reconcilitation appears possible only if whiteness itself is historicised and its poisoned
roots acknowleged As David Roediger, a cultural historian of American racism, has also
concluded, racial reconciliation requires a very unlikely thing: the abandonment of
whiteness itself5'
('(inclusion
The transparent enormity of the state's responsibility for South Africa's racial juggernaut
forecloses debate about the matter Racial domination here was the organising and
preponderant axis of the state, so manifest that it quite literally took the form of names
and addresses. Politicians and civil servants could therefore be held directly accountable
for official policies and quasi-legal atrocities alike. In contrast, the full extent of racial
domination in the US in the post-WW II era has been diminished by the perception that
"racism" was firstly, an essentially Southern phenomenon and secondly, a matter that
simmered in civil society generally against the better instincts of the state. The
privatisation of race in this manner diminished the need for a public accounting of the past
on the assumption that change would emerge once white individuals abandoned their
"prejudices" and acquired better "values" In keeping with the statist tradition of state
formation in SA, the democratic state undertook to bare its former soul. In keeping with
its own tradition of diminishing the role of the state, in the US the state has generally
ignored its compromised past.
It is surprising that SA resolved to establish a TRC because a TRC-like body was not
necessary for democracy. In contrast, it is mil surprising that the US failed to seek
reconciliation through a similarly frank interrogation of its past: a TRC would have
compelled the nation to concede that racism was a fundamental pillar of its history, as
valid and lasting as any other creed in its vaunted republican tradition. Accordingly, it was
one thing to plead men cul/ia for briefly interning innocent Americans during WW II
simply because of their Japanese ancestry. But it would have been quite another to
concede that the axis of white identities, as well as their material fortunes and political
unity, turned in no small measure on the historical subjugation and degradation of fellow
" Roediger. The Wages oj'WEhilenexs.
24
Americans for two and half centuries. Would these Americans have been white without
the presence of blacks? Does an historical fear of being assimilated to the status of slaves
and ex-slaves lie at the core of white identities? How many individual whites, and their
families, and their subsequent progeny, would have failed to prosper without a culture of
racial violence? How complicit was the state in liquidating not only the bodies of blacks
but the very prospects of African American citizenship'' Who exactly did what in the
course of this sustained racial onslaught? It is not likely that such questions will focus the
national mind on the nettlesome past anytime soon.
Could any of this happen in the light of sound historical perspective??
